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Abstract
We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed
with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell
the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilib-
rium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’
(robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equi-
librium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains
from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but
not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade
takes place.
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1 Introduction
There is a small but important literature concerned with the observation
that, in a market where all agents are allowed to behave strategically and
trade is organized via a strategic market game of the type originally in-
troduced by Shapley and Shubik [12], there are economies in which gains
from trade exist and yet there is no equilibrium in which trade takes place.
Autarky is always trivially a Nash equilibrium of the game, so interest is
focussed on when it is a ‘legitimate’ equilibrium. Cordella and Gabszewicz
[3] coin autarky ‘nice’ if it is robust to a small external bid and offer being
placed on the market (i.e. it is an ‘equilibrium point’ of the game) and pro-
vide an example of an economy in which autarky exhibits this characteristic.
Busetto and Codognato [2] call autarky ‘very nice’ if it is robust to large
perturbations in the game (i.e. it can be supported by a ‘virtual price’), and
provide an example of an economy in which autarky is nice but not very
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nice. We contribute to this literature by demonstrating that autarky is nice
iff it is the only equilibrium in the game, and very nice iff no gains from
trade exist. In a general model of bilateral oligopoly we derive conditions on
the primitives of the economy under which autarky has these characteristics,
which allows us to deduce when autarky is nice but not very nice; that is,
when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.
Interest in strategic market games stems both from the desire to provide
a strategic foundation for the price-taking assumptions in the Walrasian
model of exchange, and to provide a prediction of outcomes in markets in
which all traders have market power. Restricting attention to the market for
a single commodity in which there is also a commodity money and signals
are quantity-based, there is a trading post to which agents, being endowed
with both the good and money, can offer some of their endowment of the
good to be exchanged for money, and may bid some of their money to be
exchanged for the good. The rate of exchange of the good for money is
determined by the ratio of aggregate bid to aggregate offer. One modelling
assumption permits agents to both buy and sell the good simultaneously,
allowing agents to make wash trades. In this paper, we focus on the case
where agents are restricted to act on only a single side of the market in
a buy or sell game. Existence results for the buy and sell game are well
known (see, for instance, [5] and [9]), but there is an inherent multiplicity
of equilibria due to the fact that agents can make wash trades. Ray [10] has
noted that for a given economy equilibrium outcomes will be different in the
two games. The buy or sell game corresponds to Shapley’s ‘variant I’, and
in an early paper he commented: “our goal is a theorem that asserts [for
the game without wash trades] that a NE exists in which each commodity
has an actual price ... if actively traded, or a virtual price [so the market is
legitimately inactive] ... if not.” [11, pp 171] Excepting the literature cited,
little attention has been devoted to the study of Shapley’s ‘variant I’, and
to the best of our knowledge no there is no theorem that elucidates the
conditions under which a Shapley equilibrium exists.
We have previously studied the existence of non-autarkic Nash equilibria
in a model of bilateral oligopoly in which agents have corner endowments,
in which case whether an agent is a buyer or seller is exogenously specified
[4]. This analysis culminates in strategic versions of supply and demand,
intersections of which correspond to Nash equilibria in the game. We begin
in this paper by extending this analysis to the case of interior endowments
where agents can choose on which side of the market they want to act,
and this choice depends on the actions of others. We show that a similar
analysis utilizing strategic supply and demand functions can be used, and
that strategic supply is defined only for prices above some cutoff price P S,
and strategic demand only below a cutoff price PB, so there is a non-autarkic
Nash equilibrium if and only if P S < PB. P S and PB depend only on traders’
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preferences and their endowments.
If P S ≥ PB then the only equilibrium is autarky. Since no trader in the
game can unilaterally open the market, autarky is always an equilibrium
even if a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium exists, and has therefore been con-
sidered a trivial consequence of the trading process. Noting in an example
that autarky may be the only equilibrium in the game, Cordella and Gab-
szewicz [3] coined autarky ‘nice’ if it is an equilibrium point in the game,
that is if, when a small external bid and offer are made to the market, the
equilibrium remains close to autarky. Put another way, autarky is nice if
it is a legitimate equilibrium in the context of the game. We show that
autarky is nice if and only if it is the only equilibrium in the game. Busetto
and Codognato [2], in light of Shapley’s previously cited challenge, coined
autarky ‘very nice’ if there exists a virtual price for the equilibrium, that is,
if autarky remains an equilibrium when any external bid and offer are made
to the market (so long as they are in the proportion of the virtual price).
We show that autarky is very nice if and only if there are no gains from
trade in the economy, so it is legitimate in the context of the economy.
We also address the question of whether, in the presence of gains from
trade, trade will always take place in equilibrium. When wash trades are
allowed the answer to this question is affirmative [9]. However, we show
that when wash trades are not allowed there is a non-trivial set of economic
environments in which autarky is nice but not very nice, so despite the fact
that gains from trade exist trade will not take place. Rather, for a non-
autarkic equilibrium to exist there must be ‘sufficient’ gains from trade.
This generalizes the example of Busetto and Codognato [2] that illustrates
the phenomenon. A direct corollary gives conditions on the primitives of the
economy under which a ‘Shapley equilibrium’ exists in our model, providing
a theorem that achieves Shapley’s goal for bilateral oligopoly.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section out-
lines the economic model and the strategic market game. Our analysis of
non-autarkic equilibria proceeds in Section 3, following which we character-
ize when autarky is nice and very nice, and the relationship between these
concepts, which culminates in the conclusion that there are economic en-
vironments in which gains from trade exist and yet the only equilibrium is
autarky. Section 5 contains our concluding remarks. All proofs are collected
in an appendix.
2 The model
We wish to model trade in the market for a single commodity in which all
agents are allowed to behave strategically, actions are quantity based and
whether an agent is a buyer or seller in equilibrium is not pre-specified but
determined endogenously with market outcomes. Formally, the economy
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E =
{(
ei, ui,R
2
+
)
: i ∈ I
}
consists of two commodities; a consumption good
(x1) and a commodity money (x2). The set of agents is I = {1, . . . , i, . . . , n}
and each agent i ∈ I has an endowment given by (ei,mi) ≥ 0. Agents may
initially possess both the good and money (in which case they have an ‘inte-
rior’ endowment), or they may be endowed with either the good or money
(a ‘corner’ endowment). The preferences of agent i ∈ I over final consump-
tion bundles of the two commodities are assumed to be representable by a
utility function ui : R
2
+ → R, which we assume to be monotonic and twice
differentiable, and we write ∂i (x1, x2) for the marginal rate of substitution
with x1 units of the good and x2 units of money. We assume preferences are
binormal which, inter alia, implies (competitive) income expansion paths
are non-decreasing.
Assumption 1 For each agent i ∈ I, x1 ≤ x
′
1, x2 ≥ x
′
2 ⇒ ∂i (x) ≥ ∂i (x
′)
where the final inequality is strict if x1 < x
′
1 and x2 > 0; that is, marginal
rates of substitution increase under moves to the north-west.
Remark 1 (On gains from trade) If ei,mi > 0 for every i ∈ I then
there exist gains from trade whenever there are two agents i 6= j ∈ I for
whom ∂i (ei,mi) 6= ∂j (ej ,mj), i.e. whenever there is heterogeneity amongst
agents. When corner endowments are also permitted there may be agents i
and j for whom ∂i (ei,mi) < ∂j (ej ,mj) but no profitable exchanges between
these agents can be made because agent i has no endowment of the good or
j no endowment of money. The condition for gains from trade to exist is
thus:
min
{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{∂j (ej ,mj)} < max
{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{∂j (ej ,mj)} .
Exchange takes place according to the rules of a strategic market game
initially introduced in the research program of Shapley and Shubik (see [11]
and [12], among others). There is a trading post at which agents can offer
some of their endowment of the good to be exchanged for money and place
a bid of money to be exchanged for the good. Denoting bids and offers by
bi and qi respectively the set of strategies available to each i ∈ I is
Si = {(b, q) : 0 ≤ b ≤ mi, 0 ≤ q ≤ ei} .
Given a profile of bids and offers (b,q) ∈ S =
⋂
j∈I Sj the trading post
aggregates bids to B =
∑
j∈I bj and offers to Q =
∑
j∈I qj, and the (market
clearing) price is determined as
p =
B
Q
.
If either B = 0 or Q = 0 or both the market is deemed closed, no trade
takes place and any bids or offers made to the market are confiscated. Oth-
erwise, the market is open and, having chosen a strategy (b, q) ∈ Si, the
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final allocation awarded to agent i is
(x1, x2) = (ei − q + b/p,mi − b+ qp) . (1)
The specified trading rules constitute a well-defined game and the equi-
librium concept we use is Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies), in which
each trader may be seen as solving the problem
max
(b,q)∈Si
ui (ei − q + b/p,mi − b+ qp) , (2)
taking the actions of other traders as given.
Following Shapley’s ‘variant I’ [11, pp 167] we impose a further restriction
that each agent can enter the market as either a seller or a buyer or neither,
but not both. Thus, the strategy set of trader i ∈ I is restricted to
S˜i = {(b, q) ∈ Si : b · q = 0} . (3)
This variant is known as the buy or sell strategic market game.
Whilst existence results for the buy and sell game are well-known (see [5]
and [9], for example) much less attention has been devoted to the existence
of equilibrium when the trading rules prevent wash trading, as in the buy or
sell game. Shapley laid down the challenge in his original contribution: “our
goal is a theorem that asserts [for the buy or sell game] that a NE exists in
which each commodity has an actual price ... if actively traded, or a virtual
price [so the market is legitimately inactive] ... if not.” [11, pp 171] Busetto
and Codognato [2] have made some progress in addressing this question by
providing an example of an economy in which no such ‘Shapley equilibrium’
exists. Our aim is to determine, in the general model of bilateral oligopoly
with heterogeneous traders outlined in this section, the conditions on the
primitives of the model under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists, which
will indirectly reveal when the only equilibrium is autarky, after which we
determine when it is legitimate.
3 Non-autarkic equilibria
Inspection of the rules of the game reveal that there is always an autarkic
equilibrium in which all traders use their null strategies of bidding and offer-
ing zero to the market: if any agent believes all others will be inactive then
either a bid or offer will be confiscated, so (0, 0) is a best response confirming
(0,0) is an equilibrium profile. In this section we consider when, in addition
to the autarkic equilibrium, a non-autarkic equilibrium also exists.
Agents choose between their available strategies with the purpose of
maximizing their payoff in the game given the actions of other traders. Each
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trader can be seen as solving (2) but where (b, q) ∈ S˜i, so a Nash equilibrium
will be characterized by
∂i
(
ei − q +
b
B
Q,mi − b+
q
Q
B
)
=
1− q
Q
1− b
B
B
Q
(4)
for each i ∈ I, with the additional restriction that b · q = 0. To take
into account solutions at the boundaries of the strategy set, the equality is
replaced by ≤ (resp. ≥) if b = 0 (resp. q = 0), but these inequalities must
hold with equality if q > 0 (resp. b > 0).
In a previous paper [4] we studied the existence of non-autarkic equilib-
rium in bilateral oligopoly where agents are endowed with either the good
or money (so that the side of the market on which a player acts is specified
exogenously) by deriving strategic versions of supply and demand functions,
intersections of which are in one-to-one correspondence with non-autarkic
Nash equilibria in the game. Here, whether an agent becomes a buyer or
seller is endogenous to market outcomes, and in this section we extend our
previous work to allow for the fact that agents can choose on which side of
the market to act.
Rather than studying best responses, we seek behavior consistent with
a Nash equilibrium in which the aggregate offer and bid, including those of
the player in question, take particular values. For any B,Q > 0 define
Ri (B,Q) = (b, q) ∈
{
argmax
(q′,b′)∈S˜i
∂i
(
ei − q
′ +
b′
B − b+ b′
(
Q− q + q′
)
,
mi − b
′ +
q′
Q− q + q′
(
B − b+ b′
))
=
1− q
′
Q−q+q′
1− b
′
B−b+b′
B − b+ b′
Q− q + q′
}
.
The vector Ri (B,Q) gives the bid and offer combination of trader i ∈ I (one
of which must be zero) consistent with a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium in
which the aggregate bid is B > 0 and the aggregate offer is Q > 0. Denoting
by rbi the first component and by r
q
i the second, a Nash equilibrium in
which the aggregate bid is Bˆ > 0 and the aggregate offer is Qˆ > 0 is fixed
by the requirement that individual bids and offers sum to their respective
aggregates: ∑
i∈I
rbi
(
Bˆ, Qˆ
)
= Bˆ &
∑
i∈I
rqi
(
Bˆ, Qˆ
)
= Qˆ.
To deduce whether there are a pair of aggregates that satisfy the above
equations simultaneously, we must identify which agents will act on which
side of the market for given values of the aggregates. We proceed by fixing
the price p at a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium, for as the next lemma shows,
there is then a natural separation of agents into those that are buyers and
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those that are sellers in a Nash equilibrium with this price, should one
exist. This fact will assist in identifying non-autarkic Nash equilibria, since
having determined the ‘market structure’ we can then determine levels of
the aggregate bid and offer consistent with an equilibrium with this price.
Then, if there is a price whereby the supply equals the implied demand
(equal to the ratio of aggregate bid to price) there will be a non-autarkic
Nash equilibrium with this price.
Lemma 1 Suppose the preferences of all agents are binormal and there is a
non-autarkic Nash equilibrium in which the price is p. Then if p ≥ ∂i (ei,mi)
agent i will not be a buyer in the equilibrium, and if p ≤ ∂i (ei,mi) agent i
will not be a seller.
At the price p we call those agents for whom ∂i (ei,mi) < p potential
sellers and those for whom ∂i (ei,mi) > p potential buyers, and we define
p∗i = ∂i (ei,mi)
as the critical price at which agent i switches between being a potential
seller and a potential buyer in a Nash equilibrium with this price. If p = p∗i
trader i will be inactive in a Nash equilibrium with price p.
We now seek to determine individual behavior consistent with equilib-
rium, following which we deduce consistent aggregate behavior. Consider a
typical agent i ∈ I. If there is a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium with price
p > p∗i this trader is a potential seller in equilibrium. If the aggregate offer
of all potential sellers is Q > 0 then it can be deduced from (4) that trader
i’s offer consistent with this equilibrium is given by q = QsSi (p;Q), where
sSi (p;Q) = min {σ, ei/Q} and σ is such that
∂i (ei − σQ,mi + σQp) ≥ (1− σ) p,
with equality if σ > 0.
If there is an equilibrium with price p < p∗i then agent i is a potential
buyer at such an equilibrium and (4) can again be used to deduce that if
the bid of all potential buyers is B > 0 then the bid of trader i consistent
with the Nash equilibrium is given by b = BsBi (p;B) where s
B
i (p;B) =
min {σ,mi/B} and σ is such that
∂i (ei + σB/p,mi − σB) ≤ (1− σ)
−1 p,
with equality if σ > 0.
The functions sSi (p;Q) (resp. s
B
i (p;B)) represent agent i’s share of the
aggregate offer (resp. bid) consistent with a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium
in which the aggregate offer (resp. bid) forthcoming from all potential sellers
(resp. buyers) is Q (resp. B) and the price is p > p∗i (resp. p < p
∗
i ). It
follows from our assumptions on preferences that these characterizations,
that we call share functions, have several desiderata.
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Lemma 2 Suppose the preferences of all agents are binormal. Then for
each agent i ∈ I there exist two functions sSi (p;Q) and s
B
i (p;B) as pre-
viously defined that represent the behavior of that agent consistent with an
equilibrium in which the price is p > (<) p∗i and the aggregate offer (bid) of
all agents j ∈ I for whom p∗j < (>) p is Q (B). Moreover,
a) sSi (p;Q) is defined for all p > p
∗
i and Q > 0 where it is positive, continu-
ous and strictly decreasing in Q with the properties limQ→0 s
S
i (p;Q) =
1−
p∗i
p
and limQ→∞ s
S
i (p;Q) = 0.
b) sBi (p;B) is defined for all p < p
∗
i and B > 0 where it is positive, contin-
uous and strictly decreasing in B > 0 with limB→0 s
B
i (p;B) = 1 −
p
p∗
i
and limB→∞ s
B
i (p;B) = 0. In addition, with a fixed ratio B/p, the
function sBi (p; p[B/p]) is strictly decreasing in p.
If there is a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium with a price p such that
p∗i < p for agent i and the aggregate offer of all agents j ∈ I for whom
p∗j < p is Q > 0 then the offer of trader i consistent with this equilibrium is
QsSi (p;Q). Likewise, if there is a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium with price
p such that p∗i > p and the aggregate bid of all agents j ∈ I for whom p
∗
j > p
is B > 0 then the bid of trader i consistent with equilibrium is BsBi (p;B).
Having established behavior consistent with equilibrium at the individual
level we now proceed to determine, for each price, consistent behavior at
the aggregate level.
Consistency of aggregate supply at price p requires the sum of the indi-
vidual offers of potential sellers to be equal to the aggregate offer, or for the
sum of share functions of potential sellers to be equal to unity. Denote by
X S1 (p) the consistent aggregate supply of potential sellers at price p, which
we call strategic supply. Strategic supply is fixed by the requirement that∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj
(
p;X S1 (p)
)
= 1.
Strategic supply will not be defined for all prices. In particular, if p <
minj∈I
{
p∗j
}
then there are no potential sellers and so strategic supply will
be undefined. Interestingly, however, strategic supply does not necessarily
become positive immediately as p exceeds minj∈I
{
p∗j
}
. Recall that at price
p we seek the level of Q where
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj (p;Q) = 1. From Lemma 2 we
know that individual share functions are strictly decreasing in Q > 0, and
any sum of share functions inherits this property. As such, a necessary (and,
since share functions are continuous, sufficient) condition to find a consistent
level of Q > 0 requires p to be such that limQ→0
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj (p;Q) > 1.
Since limQ→0 s
S
i (p;Q) = 1 −
p∗
i
p
, strategic supply is only defined for prices
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such that
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
1 −
p∗
j
p
> 1. Since this sum is increasing in p (1 −
p∗i
p
increases in p for each seller, and more agents are included in the sum as p
increases), there exists a unique value of P S such that
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<P S}
1−
p∗j
P S
= 1, (5)
and strategic supply is defined and positive for all prices exceeding P S.
Similar considerations apply for potential buyers. Consistency of the ag-
gregate bid at price p requires the sum of the individual bids of potential
buyers to be equal to the aggregate bid, or for the sum of share functions of
potential buyers to be equal to one. Rather than express consistent aggre-
gate behavior in terms of the aggregate bid it is more convenient to consider
the level of aggregate demand resulting from such a bid, given by the ratio
of the bid to the price. We call this strategic demand which at price p is
given by XB1 (p), where ∑
{j∈I:p∗j>p}
sBj
(
p; pXB1 (p)
)
= 1.
Strategic demand is undefined for prices exceeding maxj∈I
{
p∗j
}
, but ar-
guments that parallel those presented above for potential sellers reveals
p < maxj∈I
{
p∗j
}
is not sufficient to guarantee positive strategic demand.
Rather, if we (uniquely) define PB by
∑
{j∈I:p∗j>PB}
1−
PB
p∗j
= 1, (6)
which is the price above which the sum of share functions of potential buyers
is less than one for all B > 0, then strategic demand is defined and positive
only for 0 < p < PB, where it is also continuous in p.
We now have representations of aggregate behavior consistent with a
non-autarkic Nash equilibrium at a given price, taking into account the fact
that a) there are strategic effects permeating the economy and b) the agents
that act on each side of the market in a Nash equilibrium are determined
endogenously. It is readily checked by definition-chasing that there is a non-
autarkic Nash equilibrium in the game at price p if and only if strategic
supply equals strategic demand at this price. If X S1 (pˆ) = X
B
1 (pˆ) then the
equilibrium strategy of trader i ∈ I is bˆi = 0, qˆi = X
S
1 (pˆ) s
S
i
(
pˆ;XS1 (pˆ)
)
if
p∗i < pˆ and bˆi = pˆX
B
1 (pˆ) s
B
i
(
pˆ; pˆXB1 (pˆ)
)
, qˆi = 0 if p
∗
i > pˆ. If p
∗
i exactly
equals pˆ trader i will be inactive in equilibrium.
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As our arguments in this section made clear, P S < PB is a necessary
condition for strategic supply and demand to intersect, and therefore for a
non-autarkic Nash equilibrium to exist. When all traders’ preferences are
binormal continuity of strategic supply and demand functions can be de-
duced by slight modifications of the arguments in [4, Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4].
As such, this condition is also sufficient for the existence of an intersection
of strategic supply and demand.
Proposition 3 Suppose the preferences of all agents are binormal. Then
there is a non-autarkic Nash equilibrium in the buy or sell strategic market
game if and only if P S < PB.
4 Autarky: nice or very nice?
The previous section analyzed the existence of a non-autarkic equilibrium
but, as noted, there is also always an autarkic equilibrium in the market
game. When it exists alongside another non-autarkic equilibrium (i.e. when
P S < PB) it may be thought of as a trivial consequence of the trading rules.
This could be formally justified by appealing to the coalition-proof refine-
ment [1] of the set of equilibria that would exclude autarky if a non-autarkic
equilibrium exists. Additional support comes from a recent experiment in-
volving a strategic market game [6] in which autarky was not observed as
an outcome of trade in an economy in which there is a non-autarkic equi-
librium. However, Theorem 3 implies that when P S ≥ PB autarky is the
only equilibrium in the game and so it cannot be classed as trivial. In this
section we investigate the relationship between the conditions under which
autarky is the only equilibrium and the conditions required for gains from
trade to exist.
We approach this by determining the conditions under which autarky is
‘nice’ and ‘very nice’, and we recall these definitions next.
Definition 4 (Dubey and Shubik [5]) Consider a modified game labelled
Γε in which there is an external bid and offer of ε placed in the market, and
consider a sequence {εn} with εn → 0 as n → ∞. Then a Nash equi-
librium of the original game
(
bˆ, qˆ
)
is ‘nice’ if and only if there is a se-
quence of equilibria in the games Γε
n
denoted
(
bˆn, qˆn
)
such that as n→∞(
bˆn, qˆn
)
→
(
bˆ, qˆ
)
.
Thus, a Nash equilibrium is nice if it is an ‘equilibrium point’ of the
game, in the sense that if a small external bid and offer are made to the
market there is not a discontinuity in traders’ behavior compared to when
these are absent.
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Definition 5 (Busetto and Codognato [2]) A Nash equilibrium
(
bˆ, qˆ
)
is ‘very nice’ if either a)
(
bˆ, qˆ
)
≫ (0,0) or b)
(
bˆ, qˆ
)
= (0,0) and there
exists a virtual price for the equilibrium, in the sense that there exists a
v > 0 such that for all δ > 0, (0,0) remains a Nash equilibrium when an
external bid of δv and offer of δ are made to the market.
Thus, the autarkic equilibrium is nice if it is an equilibrium point in the
game, and it is very nice if there exists a virtual price associated with the
equilibrium. Both concepts require an outside bid and offer to be placed on
the market; their difference lies in the fact that autarky is nice if, when a
small bid and offer are made to the market the equilibrium remains close to
autarky, whereas for autarky to be very nice it must remain an equilibrium
regardless of how large the bid and offer are (so long as they are in the same
proportion, v).
4.1 Nash equilibria with external bids and offers
The study of equilibrium points and very nice equilibria require analysis of
modified games in which an external bid and offer are made, and we now
provide an analysis of these games utilizing strategic supply and demand
functions. Define Γ (β, γ) as the game in which an external bid of β > 0
and an external offer of γ > 0 are made to the market. Unlike in the
unmodified game (that we denote Γ) it is not the case that autarky is always
an equilibrium in Γ (β, γ). Any trader can now unilaterally enter the market
to marginally alter her allocation at a rate of exchange of β/γ by trading with
the external agency without requiring opposing preferences from another
agent. As such, autarky will only be an equilibrium in the modified game if
no trader wants to unilaterally make a positive bid or offer.
With a slight abuse of notation, write X S1 (p; γ) for the strategic supply
in the game Γ (β, γ). Strategic supply is fixed by the requirement that the
sum of individual offers at price p with aggregate supply X S1 (p; γ) + γ plus
the external offer exactly equals the aggregate supply, or in share function
terms that
γ
X S1 (p; γ) + γ
+
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj
(
p;X S1 (p; γ) + γ
)
= 1. (7)
Lemma 2 implies that γ
Q+γ +
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj (p;Q+ γ) is strictly decreasing
in Q, so a necessary and sufficient condition for X S1 (p; γ) to be defined at
price p is for the limit as Q→ 0 of this expression to exceed one. But since
limQ→0
γ
Q+γ = 1, this holds whenever there is a trader with a positive value
of sSi in this same limit, and Lemma 2 can again be used to deduce that
this is the case when there is an i ∈ I for whom ei > 0 and p
∗
i < p, i.e.
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when p > min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
. Thus, in Γ (β, γ) strategic supply X S1 (p; γ)
is defined and positive for all prices exceeding min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
(where it
will also be continuous).
Likewise, strategic demand in Γ (β, γ) , that we write XB1 (p;β), is fixed
by the requirement that
β
pXB1 (p;β) + β
+
∑
{j∈I:p∗j>p}
sBj
(
p; pXB1 (p;β) + β
)
= 1. (8)
Arguments that parallel those presented above for strategic supply can be
used to deduce that strategic demand is defined, positive and continuous for
all prices less than max{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
.
Definition-chasing reveals that there is a Nash equilibrium in the game
Γ (β, γ) with price pˆ if and only if
X S1 (pˆ; γ) + γ = X
B
1 (pˆ;β) + β/pˆ. (9)
If either X S1 (pˆ; γ) > 0 or X
B
1 (pˆ;β) > 0 then the identified Nash equilib-
rium is non-autarkic: at least some traders make exchanges away from their
endowments. If X S1 (pˆ; γ) = X
B
1 (pˆ;β) = 0 then the Nash equilibrium is
autarky since the final allocation of every trader is their initial endowment.
4.2 Nice or very nice?
Using this characterization of equilibrium in modified games in which there
are external bids and offers we now turn to derive the conditions on the
primitives of the economy under which autarky is nice and very nice.
Proposition 6 Autarky is very nice if and only if min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
≥
max{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
, i.e. no gains from trade exist.
Autarky is therefore very nice when it is a legitimate equilibrium in the
context of the economy. As the next proposition shows, autarky is nice
when it is a legitimate equilibrium in the context of the game (i.e. small
perturbations to the game do not dramatically alter the equilibrium).
Proposition 7 Autarky is nice if and only if P S ≥ PB, i.e. when autarky
is the only Nash equilibrium in the game.
If there are no gains from trade, we do not expect trade to take place and
therefore for a non-autarkic equilibrium to exist. However, recent contribu-
tions to the literature that study examples of bilateral oligopoly environ-
ments have noted that there exist economies in which the only equilibrium
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in the market game is autarky even though trade would take place if the
rules of a competitive market mechanism were imposed, i.e. gains from
trade exist (see, for example, [2], [3] and [7]). Our analysis has allowed us
to find conditions on the primitives in a general model of bilateral oligopoly
under which the only equilibrium is autarky, thus generalizing these exam-
ples. It is well-known that allowing oligopolistic tendencies to permeate an
economy via price-mediated trade means that outcomes will generally be
Pareto inefficient. Our question is this: far from being just inefficient, is
there a non-trivial set of economic environments in which gains from trade
exist and yet no trade takes place at all. This question of whether autarky
is the only equilibrium in environments in which gains from trade exist
can, in the light of Propositions 6 and 7 be re-cast as: are there economic
environments in which autarky is nice but not very nice. In an economy
populated by a finite number of agents (5) and (6) can be used to deduce
that P S > min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
and PB < max{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
, which allows
us to draw the conclusion in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 If autarky is very nice it is also nice, but there are economic
environments in which autarky is nice but not very nice, in particular when
min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
< max{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
but P S ≥ PB.
This implies that there are economic environments in which gains from
trade exist and yet no trade takes place in the buy or sell game due to the
strategic behavior of agents. Indeed, the implication is that in order for
trade to take place, not only must gains from trade exist, but there need to
be sufficient gains from trade. We illustrate with an example.
Example 1 Suppose there are three agents of type A with p∗A = α∂, α < 1,
and three agents of type B with p∗B = ∂. All agents have interior en-
dowments. A competitive market involves an equilibrium with trade since
p∗A 6= p
∗
B under our assumption that α < 1. A measure of the gains from
trade is given by |p∗A − p
∗
B| = 1 − α: the smaller is α the higher the poten-
tial gains from trade. It is easily verified from (5) and (6) that P S = 32α∂
whilst PB = 23∂. Therefore, there is a non-autarkic equilibrium if and only
if 32α∂ <
2
3∂ ⇔ α <
4
9 , so ‘sufficient’ gains from trade need to exist before
trade takes place.
As Busetto and Codognato [2] note, a ‘Shapley equilibrium’ [11] exists
if either an equilibrium with trade exists or if the autarkic equilibrium can
be supported by a virtual price (i.e. is very nice). When there is no non-
autarkic equilibrium and autarky is merely nice but not very nice a Shapley
equilibrium fails to exist. Whilst Busetto and Codognato provided an ex-
ample, our analysis gives precise conditions on the primitives under which
this is the case.
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Corollary 9 A Shapley equilibrium exists if and only if a) P S < PB or b)
min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
≥ max{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
.
The observation that for the buy or sell game there may be economies
in which gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place in equilibrium
stands in contrast to the existence results for the buy and sell game. Under
certain weak conditions on traders’ preferences and endowments an interior
Nash equilibrium always exists [5], but there is an indeterminacy due to the
inherent multiplicity of equilibria resulting from the ability of agent to make
wash trades. However, if traders’ endowments are not Pareto efficient, the
equilibrium always involves trade taking place. [9] The reason an equilibrium
with trade always exists is that a trader can always ‘open the market’ by
simultaneously acting on both sides which ensures that whenever there are
gains from trade, no matter how small, trade will take place. Comparing
this to our results in the buy or sell game reveals that the ability of agents
to make wash trades is crucial to guarantee the existence of a non-autarkic
equilibrium in strategic environments: there are economies in which there
is no non-autarkic equilibrium in the buy or sell game and yet such an
equilibrium exists in the buy and sell game. This generalizes the observations
of [10].
5 Concluding remarks
Focussing on the buy or sell strategic market game in a simple model of
bilateral oligopoly, we have been able to identify non-autarkic Nash equilib-
ria in the game by intersections of strategic versions of supply and demand
functions, despite the fact that the side of the market on which an agent
wishes to act is endogenous to market outcomes. This allowed us to deduce
the conditions on the primitives of the economy under which a non-autarkic
equilibrium exists, and when autarky is the only equilibrium so no trade
takes place. It was shown that there is a non-trivial set of economic envi-
ronments in which autarky is nice but not very nice; that is, legitimate in
the context of the game but not in the context of the economy. Put dif-
ferently, there are economic environments in which gains from trade exist
and yet no trade takes place via the mechanism of the buy or sell strategic
market game. A direct corollary gives the conditions under which a Shapley
equilibrium exists. In order to guarantee that trade takes place there must
exist ‘sufficient’ gains from trade in the economy.
Strategic market games such as that studied here can be used to model,
for example, the market for tradable pollution permits when traders are
allowed to behave strategically ([8] surveys the current literature). Agents
are endowed with permits and money and whether they buy or sell permits
depends on the terms of trade. The results in this paper have clear implica-
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tions for the outcomes in such markets and highlight the importance of the
permit allocation mechanism that determines the structure of endowments
(and therefore P S and PB).
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose to the contrary that p ≥ ∂i (ei,mi) and b > 0.
Then q = 0 and ∂i (ei + b/p,mi − b) =
(
1− b
B
)−1
p. But
(
1− b
B
)−1
> 1
so ∂i (ei + b/p,mi − b) > p. However, binormality implies ∂i (ei,mi) >
∂i (ei + b/p,mi − b) with the implication that ∂i (ei,mi) > p, a contradic-
tion. Thus, b = 0 so trader i cannot be a buyer. If p ≤ ∂i (ei,mi) and q > 0
analogous reasoning reveals a similar contradiction implying that q = 0 so
trader i will not be a seller in equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2. The properties of the function sSi can be deduced
from modifications of the arguments in Lemma 3.1 in Dickson and Hartley
[4], and those of sBi from Lemmas 3.3 and 5.1, where a similar analysis was
undertaken with exogenously given sets of buyers and sellers (i.e. where
all agents have corner endowments). Since the modifications required are
slight, we do not include a formal proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. First we show that if ∂= min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
≥
max{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
= ∂¯ then there is a v such that for any δ > 0 autarky
is an equilibrium in the game Γ (δv, v). Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that
when ∂ ≥ ∂¯, strategic demand will be zero in equilibrium so long as δv/∂¯ ≥
δ ⇔ v ≥ ∂¯. Similarly, strategic supply will be zero in equilibrium when
δv/∂ ≤ δ ⇔ v ≤∂. Thus, for any v ∈
[
∂¯, ∂
]
autarky is a Nash equilibrium
for any δ > 0, and so is very nice. Since ∂¯ ≤∂ by presumption, such a level
of v exists.
Conversely, if min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
< max{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
then for any
δ, v > 0 the definition and continuity of X S1 and X
B
1 imply that there is a p˜
such that (9) is satisfied with β = δv and γ = δ, and
p˜ ∈
(
min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
,max{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{
p∗j
})
. Since p˜ > min{j∈I:ej 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
,
X S1 (p˜; δ) > 0 and since p˜ < max{j∈I:mj 6=0}
{
p∗j
}
XB1 (p˜; δv) > 0, confirming
that any Nash equilibrium is non-autarkic. Thus, no autarkic equilibrium
exists for any δ, v > 0, implying autarky is not very nice.
Proof of Proposition 7. To prove our claim we must demonstrate that
autarky is an equilibrium point when P S ≥ PB, but not when P S < PB.
Consider a sequence of modified games {Γ (εn, εn)} with εn → 0 monoton-
ically as n → ∞. We first present the following lemma that demonstrates
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Xp
XB1 (p; δv) + δv/p
δv/∂¯
∂¯
δ
∂
X S1 (p; δ) + δ
Figure 1: Very nice autarkic equilibrium.
convergence of strategic supply and demand in the modified game to their
counterparts in the unmodified game as the external bid and offer reduce to
zero.
Lemma 10 Consider a sequence of games {Γ (βn, γn)} with βn, γn → 0
monotonically as n → ∞. Then as n → ∞ X S1 (p; γ
n) + γn → X S1 (p)
uniformly in p > P S and XB1 (p;β
n)+βn/p→ XB1 (p) uniformly in p < P
B.
Proof. We demonstrate our claim for strategic supply only. The proof for
strategic demand is similar and omitted. Let Qn = X S1 (p; γ
n). Then Qn
must satisfy
γn
Qn + γn
+
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj (p;Q
n + γn) = 1. (10)
Since 0 ≤ Qn + γn ≤
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
ej + γ¯ (where γ¯ = sup {γ
n}) we conclude
that {Qn + γn} has a limit by taking subsequences if necessary, and we
write X0 = limn→∞Q
n+γn. For p > P S we can take limits in (10) (along a
subsequence if necessary) to deduce that
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj
(
p;X0
)
= 1. Since
this is true for all subsequences, it follows that X0 = X S1 (p), and therefore
that X S1 (p; γ
n) + γn →n→∞ X
S
1 (p).
To deduce uniform convergence we must show that the sequence
{
X S1 (p; γ
n) + γn
}
converges monotonically to X S1 (p) , and we will show that it does so from
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above. Suppose that γ′′ > γ′. Then it follows that
γ′′
X S1 (p; γ
′) + γ′
+
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj
(
p;X S1
(
p; γ′
)
+ γ′
)
>
γ′
X S1 (p; γ
′) + γ′
+
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj
(
p;X S1
(
p; γ′
)
+ γ′
)
= 1.
But then since X S1 (p; γ
′′)+γ′′ is the value of Q+γ that makes the left-hand
side equal to one, and γ
Q+γ +
∑
{j∈I:p∗j<p}
sSj (p;Q+ γ) is decreasing in Q+γ
(which is easily deduced from Lemma 2), it follows that X S1 (p; γ
′′) + γ′′ >
X S1 (p; γ
′)+γ′. This implies convergence is monotonic, and so Dini’s theorem
can be utilized to conclude that convergence is uniform on compact sets.
Since εn → 0 Lemma 10 implies that strategic supply and demand in the
modified games {Γ (εn, εn)} converge to their counterparts in the unmodified
game as n→∞. Our claim can then be substantiated graphically. Refer to
Figure 2. When P S < PB the conclusion in Lemma 10 implies that there is
an n′ such that for all n > n′ any pn that satisfies (9) with β = γ = εn must
be such that pn ∈
(
P S, PB
)
. But then if there is a sequence pn convergent
to p0, say, it follows that X S1 (p
n; εn) → X S1
(
p0
)
> 0 since p0 > P S, and
XB1 (p
n; εn) → XB1
(
p0
)
> 0 since p0 < PB. As such, any equilibrium point
must be non-autarkic.
X
p
∂¯
ǫn/∂¯
XB1 (p; ǫ
n) + ǫn/p
PB
XB1 (p)
ǫn
∂
X S1 (p; ǫ
n) + ǫn
P S
X S1 (p)
Figure 2: Determining whether autarky is nice.
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Conversely, when P S ≥ PB Lemma 10 implies that there is an n′′ such
that for all n > n′′ (i.e. for εn small enough) (9) holds with β = γ = εn
only for pn ∈
[
PB, P S
]
(refer also to Figure 2, letting P S ≥ PB in that
figure). But then taking limits as εn → 0 in (7) reveals X S1 (p
n; εn) → 0
(since p ≤ P S). Moreover, we can conclude that XB1 (p
n; εn) → 0 by taking
limits as εn → 0 in (8) (since p ≥ PB). Thus, as n increases without
bound any convergent sequence of equilibria converges to autarky, so it is
an equilibrium point.
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